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 Ähnlich Chief Justice Hughes in Coleman vs. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450ff. (1939), der "no basis in either Constitution or statute" fand, der Gerichtsbarkeit entsprechende Eingriffsbefugnisse zuzusprechen. "Article V, speaking solely of ratification, contains no provision as to rejection." Hinsichtlich einer etwaigen Fristsetzungskompetenz des Supreme Courts befand Hughes: "Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination? None are to be found in Constitution or stature", vgl. ebenda 453f. Siehe insgesamt zur Fragestellung, inwieweit es ich hierbei um eine "political question" handelt L. Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?, in 85 Yale L.J. (1976), S. 597 ff.
 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450, 453 (1939) (plurality opinion). Thus, considering the question of ratification after rejection, the Chief Justice found "no basis in either Constitution or statute" to warrant the judiciary in restraining state officers from notifying Congress of a State's ratification, so that it could decide to accept or reject. "Article 5, speaking solely of ratification, contains no provision as to rejection." And in considering whether the Court could specify a reasonable time for an amendment to be before the State before it lost its validity as a proposal, Chief Justice Hughes asked: "Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination? None are to be found in Constitution or statute." His discussion of what Congress could look to in fixing a reasonable time, id., 453-454, is overwhelmingly policy-oriented. On this approach generally, see Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
Fragmentsichter: Nerd_wp (Sichtungsergebnis: Gut)