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Siehe auch W.F. Murphy/ J.E. Fleming/ S.A. Barber, American Constitutional Interpretation, 2 nd ed., 1995, Part III; W.F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret the Constitution?, in: 48 Review of Politics, 1986, S. 401 ff.; ders., Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in: D. Greenberg / S.N. Katz / M.B. Oliviero / S.C. Wheatley (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy, 1993, S. 14 ff. jeweils mit weiteren Nachweisen. Entsprechend seines Einsatzes für eine „representative“ und gegen eine „constitutional democracy“ Demokratie tendiert etwa R.A. Dahl zu einer Interpretationsvorherrschaft der gewählten gesetzgebenden Körperschaft, die sich einer Prüfung lediglich durch die Wahlen auszusetzen habe. Ein richterliches Einschreiten wäre höchstens vertretbar, um einen reibungslosen Ablauf der Wahlprozesse zu gewährleisten „for an independent body to strike down laws that seriously damage rights and interests that[,] while not external to the democratic process[,] are demonstrably necessary to it would not seem to constitute a violation of the democratic process.“, vgl. ders., Democracy end Ist Critics, 1989, S. 191. Ähnlich M. Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, in: 9 Political Theory (1981), S. 379 ff. 397: „The judges must hold themselves as closely as they can to the decisions of the democratic assembly, enforcing ﬁrst of all the basic political rights that serve to sustain the character of the assembly and protecting its members from discriminatory legislation. They are not to enforce rights beyond these unless authorized to do so by a democratic decision.“ Eine solche Nähe der Richterschaft zu politischen Entscheidungen erleichtert jedoch in der Regel die Rechtfertigung jeglicher Interpretation der Verfassung, zu dieser Problematik umfassend J.H. Ely, Democracy & Distrust, 1980.
8. See, for instance, Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, and Sotirios A. Barber, American Constitutional Interpretation (2d ed; Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 1995), Part III; Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret the Constitution?" 48 Review of Politics. 401 (1986); and Murphy, "Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy," in Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven C. Wheatley, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 14-17. Because of his commitment to representative democracy and opposition to constitutional democracy, at least constitutional democracy maintained other than through political culture and democratic political processes, Robert A. Dahl would give to an elected legislature full interpretive authority, subject only to checks through open electoral processes. Reluctantly, however, he would (like Michael Walzer) allow judges to intervene to ensure that those processes were in fact open: "for an independent body to strike down laws that seriously damage rights and interests that[,] while not external to the democratic process[,] are demonstrably necessary to it would not seem to constitute a violation of the democratic process." Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 191. Walzer says: "The judges must hold themselves as closely as they can to the decisions of the democratic assembly, enforcing first of all the basic political rights that serve to sustain the character of the assembly and protecting its members from discriminatory legislation. They are not to enforce rights beyond these unless authorized to do so by a democratic decision." "Philosophy and Democracy," 9 Political Theory 379, 397 (1981). But, as John Hart Ely has - perhaps unintentionally - demonstrated, authorizing judges to police political processes inevitably justifies their engaging in much substantive constitutional interpretation. Democracy & Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).